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ABSTRACT
This paper tests for the capitalization of policy platforms into equity prices using a sample of 70
firms favored under Bush or Gore platforms during the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election. Two sources
of daily data during the six months leading up to the election are incorporated: firm-specific equity
returns and the probability of a Bush victory as implied by prices from the Iowa electronic market.
For this group of politically-sensitive firms, the daily baseline estimates demonstrate that platforms
are capitalized into equity prices: under a Bush administration, relative to a counterfactual Gore
administration, Bush-favored firms are worth 3 percent more and Gore-favored firms are worth 6
percent less, implying a statistically significant differential return of 9 percent. The most sensitive
sectors include tobacco, worth 13 percent more under a favorable Bush administration, Microsoft
competitors, worth 15 percent less under an unfavorable Bush administration, and alternative energy
companies, worth 16 percent less under an unfavorable Bush administration. A corresponding
analysis of campaign contributions, which allows for heterogeneity in the importance of policy
platforms to the firms, supports the baseline estimates. These results are then compared with results
from a more traditional event study based upon the Florida recount.
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On the day following the U.S. Supreme Court ruling that guaranteed a victory for George Bush
in the 2000 Presidential Election, several media reports noted the increase in prices of equities
favored under Bush’s campaign platforms.1 Among these so-called Bush stocks, Pﬁzer rose
4.1 percent, Exxon rose 1.3 percent, and Philip Morris rose 6.5 percent. While this anecdotal
evidence is suggestive of the capitalization of campaign platforms into equity prices, other Bush
stocks, such as Microsoft, fell in value on that day. Moreover, it is diﬃcult to separate the
reaction of equity prices to this political event from other economic and ﬁnancial developments.
A ﬁnal complication of interpretation involves investor expectations; in particular, these returns
can only be interpreted as a lower bound on the total value of favorable policies to these ﬁrms
given that markets may have largely factored in a Bush victory prior to the Supreme Court’s
ruling.
Using evidence from the period preceding the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election, this paper
attempts to overcome these complications in a test for the capitalization of public policies into
equity prices using evidence from a sample of 70 ﬁrms favored under either Bush (41 ﬁrms)
or Gore (29 ﬁrms) policy platforms. Two sources of daily data are incorporated: private
equity returns and candidate electoral prospects as implied by prices of political future con-
tracts from the Iowa Electronic Market. The daily baseline estimates provide strong evidence
that platforms are capitalized into equity prices: under the Bush administration, relative to a
counterfactual Gore administration, Bush-favored ﬁrms are worth 3 percent more and Gore-
favored ﬁrms are worth 6 percent less. The most sensitive sectors include tobacco, worth 13
percent more under a favorable Bush administration, Microsoft competitors, worth 15 percent
less under an unfavorable Bush administration, and alternative energy companies, worth 16
percent less under an unfavorable Bush administration. A corresponding analysis of campaign
contributions, which allows for heterogeneity in the importance of policy platforms to these
ﬁrms, supports the baseline estimates. These results are then compared with results from a
more traditional event study based upon the Florida recount.
These results provide evidence for the existence of election-contingent security markets,
1See, for example, The New York Times, December 14, 2000.
2as hypothesized by Musto and Yilmaz (2003); the authors demonstrate that, if such markets
exist, consumers will purchase these securities as a hedge against wealth risk induced by diﬀering
candidate platforms over redistribution. In equilibrium, wealth considerations have no eﬀect
on voting but redistribution is the same regardless of the outcome of the election. In the
context of the 2000 election, wealthy individuals could have purchased Gore-favored equities as
a hedge against a loss by Bush, who proposed to signiﬁcantly reduce federal income tax rates
at the top end of the wealth and income distribution. Of course, this evidence does not prove
that voters adopted such strategies but rather merely provides evidence on the feasibility of
such strategies.
2 Related empirical literature
Several studies have tested for the capitalization of federal tax policies into equity prices by
studying the response of equity prices to political developments during negotiations over tax
legislation. Cutler (1988), in a study of the stock market’s reaction to the passage of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, ﬁnds that the legislation’s diﬀerential treatment of old and new capital is
reﬂected in equity returns. However, the author ﬁnds no evidence of an overall market response
to the passage of this legislation, suggesting that the news was not eﬃciently incorporated
into equity prices. Lang and Shackelford (2000) ﬁnd that stock prices moved inversely with
dividend yields following a 1997 budget accord that reduced capital gains tax rates; this ﬁnding
is consistent with the capitalization of capital gains taxes into equity prices. Sinai and Gyourko
(2003) use the same natural experiment in a study of corporate-level investment subsidies and
also conclude that the tax changes were capitalized into equity prices.
A related literature studies the eﬀects of broader political events, such as elections and
changes in the ruling party, on equity prices. Using evidence from the Iowa Electronic Market,
Slemrod and Greimel (1999) demonstrate that the ﬂat tax proposal put forth by candidate Steve
Forbes during the 1996 Presidential primaries had predictable eﬀects on the U.S. municipal bond
market. Fisman’s (2001) study of Indonesia reports that equity prices of ﬁrms closely connected
to President Suharato experienced large declines, relative to prices of lesser-connected ﬁrms, in
reaction to news of Suharato’s deteriorating health. One limitation of this study is that none
3of these health episodes forced Suharato from oﬃce, and one must thus interpret these results
as a lower bound on the value of political connections.2 Jayachandran (2002) studies the
case of Senator James Jeﬀord’s party switch, which ended the Republican control of the U.S.
Senate in 2001. She ﬁnds that ﬁrms that made campaign contributions to Republicans during
the 2000 election cycle declined in value, although no corresponding increase was detected for
ﬁrms that contributed to the Democratic party. Regarding the magnitude, the defection of
Jeﬀords caused ﬁrms to lose or gain 0.8 percent of their market value in aggregate. A closely
related study to my paper is Herron et. al (1999), who use measures of candidate electoral
prospects based upon the Iowa electronic market during the 1992 Presidential election. While
using similar sources of variation, there are several diﬀerences between Herron et al. and my
paper. Most importantly, in their analysis of 74 economic sectors, the main focus of the
paper, they attempt to measure sector-speciﬁc political sensitivity by regressing rates of return
in equity markets on changes in electoral prospects separately for each of the sectors.3 My
study, by contrast, incorporates independent information on ﬁrms favored under Bush and Gore
campaign platforms and uses this information to uncover the signiﬁcance of these platforms.
Note that this type of independent information is required in order to provide evidence for
the existence of election-contingent securities as hypothesized in Musto and Yilmaz (2003).
In a theoretically-focused paper of which I became aware after writing the ﬁrst draft of my
paper, Mattozzi (2003) independently constructs an index of equity prices for ﬁrms making
signiﬁcant campaign contributions to Bush and Gore; he ﬁnds that Bush stocks rose in value
as the probability of a Bush victory increases, as implied by the Iowa Electronic Market, while
ﬁrms contributing to Gore experienced corresponding decreases.
2Fisman does attempt to quantify the value of political connections by using the return on the Jakarta Stock
Exchange Composite Index as a measure of the severity of the rumor. Based upon responses of investment
bankers in Indonesia to the question “how much would the Index had dropped if Suharto had died suddenly?”,
the author attempts to estimate the value of political connections. While suggestive, this exercise rests on the
subjective views of investment bankers and, as the author notes, involves an inference that is quite far out of
sample.
3In a separate analysis, which is not the main focus of their paper, they do incorporate information from a
First-Boston list of pro-Clinton sectors. This analysis, however, does not incorporate pro-Bush sectors and is
limited to 16 sectors, only two of which are found to be statistically signiﬁcant.
4This paper is also related to a broader literature on whether or not the release of new in-
formation moves stock market prices. Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1988) ﬁnd that neither
news associated with macroeconomic developments nor major world events fully explain move-
ments in the S&P 500. Elmendorf, Hirschfeld, and Weil (1996) examine movements in bond
prices in Britain resulting from events leading up to and including World War I; they ﬁnd that
the variance of returns is higher in weeks with important news than in other weeks. Leigh,
Wolfers, and Zitzewitz (2003) predict the economic consequences of war in Iraq by correlating
data from ﬁnancial markets with the price from a futures contract that pays only if Saddam
Hussein is ousted by a certain date. They conclude that a war raises oil prices $10 per barrel
and lowers the value of U.S. equities 15 percent.
While this paper focuses on the electoral-induced redistribution of resources across indus-
tries, a much larger literature examines the aggregate macroeconomic implications of elections.
With forward-looking voters, uncertain election outcomes, and Democrats, relative to Repub-
licans, preferring higher inﬂation rates in return for lower unemployment rates, the resolution
of electoral outcomes has macroeconomic implications. In particular, Democratic adminis-
trations should be associated with decreases in unemployment rates and increases in inﬂation
rates, while the reverse should hold for Republican administrations.4 Historical evidence from
the U.S. generally supports these predictions; see Mueller (2003) for further information.
3S o u r c e s o f D a i l y D a t a
3.1 Probability of Bush victory
The ﬁrst data source provides information on the relative electoral prospects of the two candi-
dates. Beginning May 1, 2000, the Iowa Electronic Market was open for trading in the 2000
U.S. Presidential Market. Market participants traded futures contracts on the candidates;
those purchasing the Republican contract, for example, were paid $1 in the event of a Bush
victory in the popular vote. Given the structure of this contract, the market price can be
interpreted as the probability of a Bush victory. I have obtained closing prices from the Iowa
Electronic Market as of 4 p.m. Eastern time, allowing for synchronization with the closing price
4See Alesina (1987), Alesina (1988), and Alesina and Rosenthal (1995).
5data on equities from ﬁnancial markets.
As shown in Figure 1, the Iowa Electronic Market data demonstrate that the 2000 race was
extremely close throughout the six months preceding the election, with Gore taking the lead
following the Republican National Convention (labeled RNC) and the Democratic National
Convention (labeled DNC), both held in August, before Bush pulled ahead during the three
Presidential debates (labeled D1, D2, and D3), which were held during October. Bush extended
this lead in early November, and, by November 6, the eve of the election and ﬁnal day of the
sample, the implied probability of a Bush victory had risen to just over 75 percent.
While contracts based upon the electoral college, rather than the popular vote, would be
preferable, I believe that the ex-post divergence between electoral college and popular vote
outcomes in the 2000 election was largely unexpected and thus electoral college contract prices
would have been similar to those of the popular vote contracts. Such divergences are historically
rare; the previous divergence occurred in 1888. In the 2000 election, neither candidate had a
signiﬁcant ex-ante electoral college advantage. Analysts expected, if anything, Gore to have a
slight electoral college advantage.5
For several reasons, the Iowa Electronic Market data are preferred to tracking poll data.
First, the latter data provide expected vote shares while the former data provide probabilities
of victory. Such probabilities, as will be shown below, are required in order to quantify
the value of favorable policies.6 The second advantage of the Iowa Electronic Market data
involves eﬃciency. According to an analysis of 15 elections, the market worked extremely
well, dominating opinion polls on average in forecasting the outcome of the election (Berg et
al, 2000).7 Even given these limitations associated with polling data, Figure 2 demonstrates
that Gallup tracking poll data, which are available on a daily basis beginning September 7,
2000, move in tandem with prices from the Iowa Electronic Market. As shown in Table 1, a
regression of Bush’s share of the two-party support in the Gallup poll on the IEM Bush contract
5New York Times, October 27, 2000.
6Of course, one could attempt to map vote shares into probabilities, but this relationship is likely to be non-
linear and time dependent; movements in vote shares imply small swings in probabilities early in the campaign
but the magnitude of such swings increases as election day approaches.
7See also Forsythe et al (1992) and Rhode and Strumpf (2003) for a historical analysis of Presidential election
betting markets.
6price demonstrates that this relationship is statistically signiﬁcant, and this result is robust to
as p e c i ﬁcation in ﬁrst diﬀerences.
3.2 Equity Returns
Equity prices are taken from the Dow Jones Interactive Service and are adjusted for dividends
and stock splits. To account for broader trends in equity markets during the sample period, I
follow event study methodology outlined by MacKinlay (1997) and use abnormal returns in the
analysis. In order to calculate these abnormal returns, I ﬁrst estimate the following market
model:
rit = αi + βirmt + εit (1)
where rit is the daily rate of return of ﬁrm i on day t. As a measure of broad market returns
(rmt), I use the Wilshire 5000. The market model is estimated between May 1, 1999 and
April 30, 2000, the one-year period preceding the opening of the Iowa Electronic Market on
May 1, 2000. Based on the estimated parameters (b αi,b βi) from ﬁrm-speciﬁc regressions, I then
calculate daily abnormal returns (e rit), which are net of market returns, as follows for the period
May 1, 2000 through November 6, 2000 as follows:
e rit = rit − (b αi + b βirmt) (2)
These abnormal returns are then used in the empirical analysis below.
4 Analysis of campaign platforms
As measures of Bush and Gore platforms, I use reports from ﬁnancial analysts associated with
Lehman Brothers, Prudential Securities, and International Strategy and Investment. These
reports were produced during the campaign and identiﬁed ﬁrms likely to fare well under Bush
and Gore administrations. As shown in Table 2, these three reports list 41 ﬁrms in total favored
under Bush campaign platforms and 29 ﬁrms favored under Gore platforms. Key diﬀerences in
these campaign platforms are listed below. Supporting evidence for these diﬀerences, including
7candidate press releases and quotes from the three Presidential debates, is provided in Appendix
A.
1) Pharmaceuticals: Gore favored price controls and promoted generic pharmaceuticals,
while Bush defended large pharmaceuticals and opposed price controls.
2) Defense: Bush favored large spending increases, while Gore focused on improving tech-
nology.
3) Energy: Bush favored an expansion of domestic exploration of conventional energy
sources, such as oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), while Gore promoted
the development of alternative energy sources.
4) Microsoft case: While neither candidate committed to a speciﬁc policy regarding Mi-
crosoft, Bush was seen by most analysts as more pro-Microsoft than was Gore. In September
2001, following Bush’s inauguration, the Justice Department dropped eﬀorts initiated by the
Clinton Administration to break up Microsoft.
5) Tobacco: Gore favored allowing the FDA to regulate nicotine as an addictive substance,
while Bush did not commit to a speciﬁc platform on this issue.
While these 70 ﬁrms represent a small fraction of the roughly 6000 publicly traded ﬁrms
in the United States, these are some of the largest ﬁrms. As of May 1, 2000, the ﬁrst day
of the sample period, the aggregate market capitalization of these 70 ﬁrms totaled almost $3
trillion, representing almost one-ﬁfth of the $16 trillion market capitalization of the Wilshire
5000, which includes nearly all publicly traded equities.
As shown in Figure 3, the probability of Bush victory is positively correlated with the log
diﬀerence between Bush and Gore equity prices, especially in the three months preceding the
election, suggesting that policy platforms matter for ﬁrm proﬁtability. Perhaps somewhat
surprisingly, equity market returns appear to be a leading indicator of the price of a Bush
contract in the Iowa Electronic Market. The empirical analysis below will attempt to address
this issue by estimating speciﬁcations that include both leads and lags of the probability of a
Bush victory.
4.1 Empirical Model
8Consider the following empirical model of ﬁrm i’s rate of return at time t:
rit = αi + β1Bush-favoredi∆Pr(Bush)t + β2Gore-favoredi∆Pr(Bush)t + uit (3)
where Bush-favoredi indicates whether the ﬁrm is favored under the Bush platform, ∆Pr(Bush)t
indicates the daily change in the probability of a Bush victory, uit captures unobserved factors
aﬀecting returns, and αi,β1, and β2 represent parameters to be estimated. The ﬁxed eﬀects
(αi)a l l o wf o rﬁrm-speciﬁc trends in equity prices during the sample period, while β1 and β2
are the key parameters in the test for capitalization; these parameters can be interpreted as
follows:




β1 if Bush-favoredi =1
β2 if Bush-favoredi =0
(4)
Thus, the parameter β1 can be interpreted as the percentage diﬀerence in a Bush-favored ﬁrm’s
market value under a Bush administration, relative to a counterfactual Gore administration,
while β2 captures a similar percentage diﬀerence for Gore-favored ﬁrms. The capitalization
hypothesis predicts β1 > 0 and β2 < 0.
4.2 Baseline Results
As shown in column 1 of Table 3, the preliminary results demonstrate that, for this group of
politically-sensitive ﬁrms, campaign platforms matter for ﬁrm proﬁtability, and this relationship
is both economically and statistically signiﬁcant. Gore-favored ﬁrms are worth 6 percent less
under a Bush administration, relative to a friendlier Gore administration. Bush-favored ﬁrms,
by contrast, are worth 3 percent more under a friendlier Bush Administration. In monetary
terms, Bush’s victory over Gore transferred over $100 billion in market capitalization from
the 29 Gore-favored ﬁrms to the 41 Bush-favored ﬁrms.8 The diﬀerential return (β1− β2),
as shown at the bottom of Table 3, is 9 percent and is statistically signiﬁcant at conventional
8As of May 1, 2000, the ﬁrst day of the sample period, the 29 Gore-favored ﬁrms had a total market capital-
ization of $1.1 trillion, while the 41 Bush-favored ﬁrms had a $1.9 trillion capitalization.
9levels; this statistic provides a somewhat weaker test of the capitalization hypothesis and is
more consistent with the evidence in Figure 3, which depicts returns for Bush-favored equities
relative to Gore-favored equities.
As shown, the political measures have limited explanatory power as the R-squared is only
0.0196. While each of the 133 events has only limited explanatory power, this limitation
must be balanced against two beneﬁts. First, as noted above, event studies in the existing
literature often measure only a lower bound on the value of favorable policies, while, by utilizing
probability-based measures, my study provides a point estimate. Second, the large number of
events provides additional statistical power. The relative strengths and weaknesses of these
two approaches will be examined in more detail in Section 6, which, for comparison purposes,
provides a companion event study based upon the Florida recount.
As was shown in Figure 3, daily movements in stock prices and candidate electoral prospects
tend to exhibit high levels of variance. In an attempt to smooth through some of this daily
variance, column 2 of Table 3 presents estimates using weekly data (Friday close to Friday
close). As shown, the R-squared rises signiﬁcantly from 0.02 to 0.13, and the estimated
value of favorable policies for Gore-favored ﬁrms rises substantially from 6 to 12 percent, and
this result is statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. The estimated value of favorable
policies for Bush-favored ﬁrms also rises from 3 to 4 percent, although this result is statistically
insigniﬁcant, perhaps reﬂecting the loss in power from the reduced sample size. The diﬀerential
return also rises from 9 to 16 percent, a statistically signiﬁcant result.
4.3 Robustness Checks
As a ﬁrst robustness check, Table 4 splits the dai l ys a m p l ei nav a r i e t yo fw a y sa c c o r d i n gt o
Iowa Electronic Market institutional details. The ﬁrst institutional detail involves the size of
price changes. Large changes in prices of futures contracts may represent real political news,
while smaller changes may simply reﬂect noisy trading patterns. The ﬁrst two columns support
this hypothesis: the sample of days with large changes (greater than one percentage point in
absolute value) in the price of a Bush contract supports a statistically signiﬁcant result, while
the sample of days with small changes (less than or equal to one percentage point), by contrast,
provides statistically insigniﬁcant results for the Bush-favored ﬁr m s . T h es e c o n ds p l i to ft h e
10data involves trading volume. On thinly traded days, market prices may not incorporate all
relevant information from the campaign, and columns 3 and 4 partially support this hypothesis.
The high volume (at least 229 trades in Bush contracts) sample, unlike the low volume (less
than 229 trades in Bush contracts) sample, supports a statistically signiﬁcant estimated value
of favorable policies for Gore-favored ﬁrms. For Bush-favored ﬁrms, by contrast, the result is
statistically insigniﬁcant in the high-volume sample but signiﬁcant in the low-volume sample.
As an additional robustness check, Table 5 presents the coeﬃcients on the contemporaneous
change in the probability of a Bush victory after controlling leads and lags in the change in the
probability of a Bush victory. As shown in column 1, after controlling for 4 lags in the change
in the probability of a Bush victory (coeﬃcients not reported), the contemporaneous results
are similar to those in the baseline results of Table 3. Incorporating a one-week lag into the
weekly speciﬁcation (column 2) again produces results similar to those in the baseline analysis.
Columns 3 and 4 present results incorporating leads of changes in the probability of a Bush
victory. Again, the coeﬃcients on the contemporaneous change in the probability of a Bush
victory are similar to those in the baseline analysis.
4.4 Sector Analysis
The above analysis incorporated the implicit assumption that policy platforms were equally
important to all ﬁrms in the sample. This section relaxes that assumption in a sector-by-
sector analysis. As shown in column 1 of Table 6, three out of the ﬁve sectors demonstrate
statistically signiﬁcant results using daily data. Alternative energy companies, which were
favored under Gore’s energy platforms, are worth 16 percent less under Bush, while conventional
energy companies appear to be politically insensitive. Microsoft competitors are worth 15
percent more under a Bush administration; no relationship is detected for Microsoft itself,
perhaps reﬂecting the sample size of a single ﬁrm. Finally, tobacco ﬁrms are worth 13 percent
more under Bush, relative to Gore, who favored FDA regulation of nicotine as an addictive
drug. Column 2 presents results using weekly data. As shown, only one sector, Gore-favored
pharmaceuticals, is statistically signiﬁcant, perhaps reﬂecting the loss in statistical power from
the reduced sample size.
115 Campaign contribution analysis
I next provide an analysis of campaign contributions for this group of 70 politically sensitive
ﬁrms. During the 2000 campaign, corporations made both hard money contributions to candi-
dates, through their political action committees (PACs), and soft money contributions directly
from their treasuries to political parties. In the results presented below, I simply sum together
hard and soft money contributions.9 The remainder of this section describes in more detail
data on hard and soft money campaign contributions.
5.1 Hard money contributions
During the 2000 election cycle, corporate PACs were permitted to contribute up to $10,000 to
a given candidate. According to data from the Center For Responsive Politics (CRP), 17 out
of these 70 ﬁrms had political action committees that donated to the Bush campaign during
the 2000 election cycle. As shown in Table 7, the average contribution across all ﬁrms was
around $1,000 with Bush-favored ﬁrms contributing slightly more. The Gore campaign, by
contrast, did not accept contributions from corporate political action committees.
5.2 Soft money contributions
While hard money contributions were capped at $10,000 per candidate during the 2000 election
cycle, corporations could make unlimited soft money contributions directly to political parties,
and these contributions have played an increasingly important role in recent Presidential elec-
tions.10 As shown in Table 7, contributions, as measured by the CRP, from these ﬁrms to
the RNC exceeded contributions to the DNC, and this eﬀect is particularly noticeable among
Bush-favored ﬁrms. Gore-favored ﬁrms, by contrast, gave similar amounts on average to the
RNC and DNC.
9I have also estimated speciﬁcations that allow the coeﬃcient to vary across hard and soft money contributions.
The results were strongest for soft money contributions, an unsurprising result given their large magnitude,
relative to hard money contributions, as shown in Table 7.
10According to an analysis of political television advertisements in the 75 largest markets in the United States
during the 2000 campaign season, the Republican party sponsored 52 percent of pro-Bush advertisements while
the Democratic Party sponsored 48 percent of pro-Gore advertisements (Wisconsin Advertising Project, 2002).
12While political parties are restricted by law from sponsoring “express advocacy” adver-
tisements, those designed to promote speciﬁc candidates, they may sponsor “issue advocacy”
advertisements. In principle, issue advocacy is designed to promote speciﬁc policies but, in
practice, such advertisements can promote speciﬁc candidates.11 As shown in Appendix B,
the text of two “issue advocacy” advertisements from the 2000 campaign clearly demonstrates
that advertisements sponsored by political parties can promote speciﬁc candidates.
The primary drawback of using soft money contributions to political parties is that not all
contributions to political parties were used to promote the two Presidential candidates. To
address, at least in part, this data limitation, I exclude those contributions to parties designed
to explicitly fund Congressional candidates.12
5.3 Empirical Model
Consider the following empirical model of ﬁrm i’s rate of return at time t:















i represent ﬁrm i’s campaign contribution to the two candidates and Vit−1
represents yesterday’s market capitalization and scales campaign contributions according to ﬁrm
size. Multiplying both sides of this expression by Vit−1 and noting that rit =( Vit−Vit−1)/Vit−1,
one can derive the following expressions:








11Advertisements are considered issue advocacy so long as they do not contain what have become known as
magic words, which include “vote for”, “vote against”, “support” or “defeat”.
12More speciﬁcally, I include only contributions from corporations to the Democratic National Committee
(DNC) and the Republican National Committee (RNC). I thus exclude soft money contributions to party com-
mittees established to fund campaigns of Congressional candidates, including the National Republican Congres-
sional Committee (NRCC), National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC), Democratic Senatorial Cam-
paign Committee (DSCC), and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC).
13Thus, the parameter β1 captures the increase in market capitalization associated with an extra
dollar in contributions to Bush in the event of a Bush victory. The parameter β2 captures
a similar relationship associated with contributions to Gore. The capitalization hypothesis
predicts β1 > 0 and β2 < 0.
One caveat of this analysis involves motives for contributing to candidates. In particular,
this analysis cannot distinguish between the two motives identiﬁed by Grossman and Help-
man (1996): electoral motives (contributing in order to alter election outcomes) and inﬂuence
motives (contributing in order to inﬂuence campaign platforms). The latter motive would
be associated with a causal interpretation of campaign contributions, while, under the former
motive, ﬁrms contribute to candidates with platforms favorable to their business interests, and
the relationship is not necessarily causal. Under either motive, however, campaign contri-
butions are positively correlated with the beneﬁts of favorable policy platforms. Campaign
contributions can thus be considered an alternative measure of the beneﬁts ﬁrms receive from
policy platforms. These contributions, although a less direct measure of policy platforms than
that used in the baseline analysis, are a continuous measure and thus allow for heterogeneity
in political sensitivity across ﬁrms.
As shown in column 1 of Table 8, contributions to Gore, conditional on contributions to
Bush, are associated with a reduction in market value under a Bush administration in a statis-
tically and economically signiﬁcant manner. Conversely, contributions to Bush are associated
with a signiﬁcant increase in market value under a Bush administration. The weekly results, as
s h o w ni nc o l u m n2 ,a r es t a t i s t i c a l l yi n s i g n i ﬁcant, perhaps reﬂecting the loss in power associated
with the reduced sample size.
6 Florida recount analysis
This section provides a companion event study based upon the Florida recount. This analysis
serves two purposes. First, it provides a cross validation of the baseline results, which used
probabilities of candidate electoral success as implied by prices from the Iowa electronic market.
Second, it allows for a comparison with event studies in the existing literature by highlighting
14the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two approaches.
Following the November 7 election, the state of Florida, which was pivotal in the electoral
college, was required by state law to conduct a recount of its initial results, which had provided
Bush with a slim lead. On November 26, after several weeks of legal wrangling over the
appropriate scope of the recount, Florida’s Secretary of State Katherine Harris certiﬁed Bush
the winner by a margin of 537 votes. On the following day, Gore oﬃcially contested the
election results. On December 8, after several more weeks of legal and political developments,
the Florida Supreme Court ordered further recounts. However, on the next day, Saturday,
December 9, the U.S. Supreme Court halted further recounting and over-ruled the Florida
Supreme Court’s decision on December 12. The following evening, December 13, witnessed
the concession of Gore and the declaration of victory by Bush.
For the purposes of this analysis, the Florida recount is considered as a single event, which
is assumed to begin on November 8, the day after the election, and to end on December 14, the
day following Gore’s concession, which occurred after the close of markets on December 13.13
Using the sample of 70 ﬁrms described in the baseline analysis above, a policy platform-based
model, given below, is estimated:
ri = β1Bush-favoredi + β2Gore-favoredi + ui (8)
As shown in Table 9, rates of returns for Bush-favored ﬁrms exceeded those of Gore-favored
ﬁrms by about 4 percent, although this result is statistically insigniﬁcant. Regarding the
magnitude, this estimate of the value of favorable policy platforms is smaller than are those in
the baseline estimates, suggesting that markets had already factored in a Bush victory.
In addition, an event study using campaign contributions to the candidates is provided.
The following model is estimated:









13Of course, one could analyze legal and developments during the recount as separate events. Unfortunately,
it is diﬃcult to identify days which were favorable for Gore. The most promising announcement for Gore, the
Friday, December 8 order for further recounts, was issued after the close of equity markets, and the U.S. Supreme
Court halted further recounting before markets opened again on Monday, December 11.
15As shown in the second column of Table 9, contributions to Gore were associated with lower re-
turns, a statistically signiﬁcant relationship. No statistically signiﬁcant relationship is detected
for contributions to Bush. Again, these relationships are somewhat weaker in magnitude than
are those in the baseline analysis.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Using evidence from the Bush / Gore 2000 Presidential Election, this paper has demonstrated
that policy platforms are capitalized into equity prices for a sample of 70 politically sensitive
ﬁrms in the United States. According to the daily platform-based estimates, favorable public
policies account for 3-6 percent of a ﬁrm’s total value. The most sensitive sectors include
tobacco, worth 13 percent more under Bush, Microsoft competitors, worth 15 percent less
under Bush, and alternative energy companies, worth 16 percent less under Bush. An analysis
of campaign contributions supports the baseline results. These results are then compared with
results from a more traditional event study based upon the Florida recount.
These results have several implications for the empirical literatures discussed above. While
several studies have found that political developments during negotiations over tax legislation
have expected eﬀects on equity prices, my ﬁndings suggest that policies may be reﬂected in
equity prices during the electoral process, which occurs long before the legislative enactment
of policies. The second literature discussed above examines the response of equity prices to
broader political events; my study demonstrates that such event analyses may only measure
a lower bound on the value of favorable policies to ﬁrms and thus tend to understate the
relationship between economic and political factors. Regarding the literature on the reﬂection
of news in equity prices, while the electoral measures do not fully explain the variation in equity
returns, my results demonstrate that news is eﬃciently incorporated into equity prices, and this
relationship is economically and statistically signiﬁcant. Finally, these results suggest that the
most signiﬁcant economic impact of elections may be on the distribution of resources across
industries rather than upon aggregate measures of inﬂation and unemployment.
16A Evidence on Campaign platforms14
A.1 Pharmaceuticals
Q: What about expensive prescription drugs?
BUSH: Step one is to reform the Medicare system. I want to call upon Republicans and
Democrats to take care of a senior prescription drug program. I think it’s important to
have what’s called Immediate Helping Hand, which is direct money to states so seniors
don’t have to chose between food and medicine.
GORE: I have never been afraid to take on the big drug companies. They are now spending
more money on advertising than they are on research. They’re trying to artiﬁcially extend
the monopoly so they can keep charging high prices. I want to streamline the approval of
generic drugs so that we bring the price down. I proposed a prescription drug beneﬁt under
Medicare. You pick your own doctor and the doctor chooses the prescription and nobody
can overrule your doctor. You go to your own pharmacy and Medicare pays half. If you’re
poor, they pay all of it. If you have extraordinarily high costs, then they pay all over $4,000
out of pocket.
Source: St. Louis debate Oct 17, 2000
As a Congressman, Al Gore fought the pharmaceutical industry to bring lower-cost generic
drugs to market faster. Now, he has issued a new plan to make high-cost prescription drugs
more aﬀordable for those who rely on them. As President, Gore will oppose all unwar-
ranted patent extensions [that keep generics oﬀ the market]. He would vigorously enforce
laws against collusion to prop up artiﬁcially high prices for drugs; and push legislation to
discourage delaying the approval of generic drugs.
Source: Press Release Mar 31, 2000
A.2 Defense
Saying we have “asked our servicemen and women to do too much with too little,” Bush
14All of the information in Appendix A was taken from the website www.issues-2002.org (accessed January
26, 2003).
17today promoted his agenda for rebuilding America’s military by improving troop morale and
investing in research and development. “Even the highest morale is eventually undermined
by back-to-back deployments, poor pay, shortages of spare parts and equipment, and rapidly
declining readiness. I make this pledge to our men and women in arms: As President, I
will preserve American power for American interests. And I will treat American soldiers
with the dignity and respect they have earned.” To improve America’s military, Governor
Bush will: Improve troop morale [via] better pay, better treatment and better training.
[Bush would add] a billion dollars in salary increases, and renovate military housing that is
sub-standard. Invest in research and development by at least $20 billion over the next ﬁve
years, 20% [of which] must be spent for purchasing next generation weapons.
Source: Press Release, “Improving Troop Morale” May 31, 2000
Since World War II, there have been several build-downs that have strained America military
readiness. In contrast, the current Administration’s handling of the post-Cold War build-
down has yielded a force that while smaller, is more agile, more powerful, and more eﬀective
at countering new strategic threats. The build-down can now be matched by a careful
investment in further transforming the forces and endowing them with the cutting edge
technology they will need to succeed in their missions.
Source: AlGore2000.com Press Release, “Strengthening” May 27, 2000
A.3 Energy
GORE: Governor Bush is proposing to open up some of our most precious environmental
treasures, like the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, to the big oil companies to go in and
start producing oil there. I think that is the wrong choice. It would only give us a few
months worth of oil, and the oil wouldn’t start ﬂowing for many years into the future. And
I don’t think it’s a fair price to pay, to destroy precious parts of America’s environment.
BUSH: We need an active exploration program in America. The only way to become less
dependent on foreign sources of crude oil is to explore at home. And you bet I want to
open up a small part of Alaska because when that ﬁeld is online, it will produce a million
barrels a day. Today we import a million barrels from Saddam Hussein. I would rather
18that a million come from our own hemisphere, our own country, as opposed from Saddam
Hussein.
Source: Presidential debate, Boston MA Oct 3, 2000
Q: What is your energy policy?
GORE [to Bush]: We have to free ourselves from big oil, from OPEC. We have to give
new incentives for the development of resources, like deep gas in the western Gulf, but also
renewable sources of energy and domestic sources that are cleaner and better. I’m proposing
a plan that will give tax incentives for the rapid development of new kinds of cars, trucks,
buses, factories, boilers, and furnaces that don’t have as much pollution.
BUSH: I want to build pipelines to move natural gas. I want to develop coal resources. It’s
an issue I know a lot about. I was a small oil person for a while. This is an administration
that’s had no plan. And now, the results of having no plan have caught up with America.
We’ve got abundant supplies of energy here, and we better start exploring it. There’s an
interesting issue up in the Northwest, as well. And that is whether or not we remove dams
that propose hydroelectric energy. I’m against removing dams in the Northwest.
Source: Presidential debate, Boston MA Oct 3, 2000
A.4 Microsoft Case
While Gore has broken ranks with the president on several recent occasions, he and President
Clinton have remained quiet on Microsoft. In November, at Microsoft headquarters, Gore
said stern antitrust action sometimes is needed to break up “unhealthy concentrations of
power” that snuﬀs out competition. Gore stressed, however, that he was speaking only of
his belief in the “fundamental American value” of making sure that neither heavy-handed
government for unfair business practices quash competition.
Source: Associated Press Apr 9, 2000
19The government won the ﬁrst round of the antitrust case against Microsoft, but with years
of legal appeals anticipated, who the new president is could change how the case is resolved.
Bush has signaled he would be more friendly to the company.
A law professor said, “Could the outcome of the election have an impact on the case? Yes.
But less because of control over the Justice Dept. and more because of control over the
Supreme Court.” Judge Jackson could send the case directly to the Supreme Court.
Source: Associated Press Apr 9, 2000
A.5 Tobacco
There is no greater threat to the health and safety of our children than tobacco. Tobacco
hooks 3,000 teens every day, and more than 1,000 will die from it. If our children don’t start
smoking by the time they turn 19, they’re unlikely to start at all. The President’s anti-
tobacco plan will reduce teen smoking by 42% over the next ﬁve years. I call on Congress
to pass comprehensive, bipartisan anti-tobacco legislation — and to do it now.
Source: Al Gore speech to National PTA, Jun 14, 1999
Gore said Congress should give the FDA power to regulate nicotine as an addictive drug.
Gore has become a passionate opponent of the tobacco industry, but once bragged of working
in tobacco ﬁelds on his family’s farm and until 1990 accepted tobacco [PAC money]. In 1996,
he moved many with an account of the death of his sister from lung cancer. Today Gore
accused the cigarette companies of recruiting teenagers as “replacement smokers” for the
400,000 people who die each year of smoking-related illnesses.
Source: NyTimes.com Mar 22, 2000
Bush, in a statement issued by his campaign headquarters, called on Congress and state
legislatures to pass laws to restrict access to tobacco by minors. Texas, he said, had already
passed some of the toughest such laws in the nation.
Bush did not address the question that faced the Supreme Court today, whether the FDA
should be empowered to regulate tobacco as a harmful and addictive drug. A spokeswoman
said the governor had never answered that question and was not prepared to do so today.
20The Bush statement said the governor “believes Congress should pass tough laws to keep
tobacco out of the hands of kids similar to strict anti-teen smoking laws he advocated and
signed in Texas.”
Texas imposes ﬁnes on retailers who sell cigarettes to minors, prohibits cigarette vending
machines in areas accessible to children and restricts tobacco advertising within 1,000 feet
of schools and churches.
Source: NyTimes.com Mar 22, 2000
21B Text of advertisements sponsored by political parties
Below is the text of “Really”, a television advertisement produced by the Republican National Commit-
tee.
Woman: “There’s Al Gore reinventing himself on television again. Like I’m not going to
notice. Who’s he gonna be today? The Al Gore who raises campaign money at a Buddhist
temple? Or the one who now promises campaign ﬁnance reform? Really. Al Gore . . .
claiming credit for things he didn’t even do.”
Gore: “I took the initiative in creating the Internet.”
Woman: “Yeah and I invented the remote control, too. Another round of this, and I’ll sell
my television.”15
Below is the text of “Oil and Water”, a television advertisement produced by the Democratic National
Committee:
Narrator: “They say oil and water don’t mix. Nowhere is that more true than in Texas.
After 17 years in the oil business, George W. Bush ran for governor, then passed laws to
let big polluters regulate themselves. Today, Texas is number three in water pollution;
number one in air pollution. For over 20 years, Al Gore has fought against polluters; and
helped pass laws to clean up our air and water. America’s environment is cleaner now. Do
we really want it to look like Texas?”16
15Washington Post, August 31, 2000.
16Washington Post, October 10, 2000.
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Figure 1: Electoral Probabilities from the Iowa Electronic Market
date
 Pr(Gore)  Pr(Bush)






 Figure 2: Gallup tracking poll versus Iowa Electronic Market
date



















 Log difference in price  Pr(Bush)
















Figure 3: Bush and Gore average stock prices
date
 Log difference in price  Pr(Bush)






Specification Levels First differences
constant -0.7788** 0.0043
(0.1835) (0.0041)
Bush share of two-party vote 2.4958** 0.5662**




Iowa Electronic Market and Gallup Tracking Poll
Notes: dependent variable is price of IEM Bush contract, standard errors in parentheses, ** denotes significance at 95% level, * at 90% level
 Firm Ticker Lehman Prudential ISI Group Sector
Aetna AET   yes
Alliance Capital Management AC   yes  
Ambac Financial Group ABK   yes  
Baker  Hughes BHI  yes  Energy
Boeing BA   yes Defense
BP Amoco BP   yes yes Energy
Bristol Meyers Squibb BMY yes   yes Pharmaceuticals
Charles Schwab SCH   yes  
Chevron CVX yes   Energy
El Paso Energy EPG   yes   Energy
Eli Lilly LLY yes   yes Pharmaceuticals
Enron ENRN yes   Energy
Genentech DNA yes   
General Dynamics GD   yes yes Defense
Georgia-Pacific  Group GP  yes  Energy
Goldman Sachs Group GS   yes  
Household International HI   yes  
Lockheed Martin LMT yes yes yes Defense
Loews LTR   yes Tobacco
MBIA MBI  yes  
Merck MRK  yes  Pharmaceuticals
Microsoft MSFT yes yes yes Microsoft case
Nabors  Industry NBR  yes  Energy
Nationwide Financial NFS   yes  
Northrop  Grumman NOC  yes  Defense
Pfizer PFE  yes yes Pharmaceuticals
Pharmacia PHA   yes Pharmaceuticals
Philip Morris MO   yes yes Tobacco
Providian Financial PVN   yes  
Raytheon RTN   yes Defense
RJR Tobacco Holdings RJR     yes Tobacco
SBC Communications SBC yes    
Schering  Plough SGP   yes Pharmaceuticals
SLM Holding SLM   yes yes
State Street STT   yes  
T.Rowe Price Associates TROW   yes yes
United Health Group UNH   yes yes
Verizon VZ yes   
WebMD HLTH yes    
Wellpoint Health Networks WLP   yes  
Weyerhaeuser WY  yes yes Energy
Table 2a: Firms Favored Under Bush PlatformFirm Ticker Lehman Prudential ISI Group Sector
America Online AOL   yes yes Microsoft case
American General Corporation AGC   yes  
American International Group AIG   yes  
Archer Daniels Midland ADM   yes  
AT&T T yes   
AXA Financial AXF   yes  
Bank One ONE   yes  
Caremark  RX CMX   yes Pharmaceuticals
Deere DE  yes  
Exodus Communications EXDSQ yes    
Express  Scripts ESRX   yes Pharmaceuticals
Fannie Mae FNM yes yes yes
Fleet Boston Financial FBF   yes  
Freddie Mac FRE yes yes yes
H&R Block HRB   yes  
Lincoln National LNC   yes  
Linux LNUX   yes Microsoft  case
Marsh & Mclennan MMC   yes  
Oracle ORCL yes   Microsoft  case
Plug  Power PLUG yes   Energy
Roy F. Weston WSTNA   yes   Energy
Sevenson Environmental SEVN   yes yes Energy
Sun Microsystems SUNW yes yes yes Microsoft case
Syntroleum SYNM   yes Energy
TEVA  Pharmaceutical TEVA yes   Pharmaceuticals
The Chubb Corporation CB   yes  
The Hartford Financial Services Group HIG   yes  
Watson  Phamaceutical WPI yes   Pharmaceuticals








Equity fixed effects yes yes
Differential return 0.0862** 0.1607**
Table 3
Capitalization of Policy Platforms: Baseline Estimates
Notes: dependent variable is abnormal rate of return, standard errors in parentheses, ** denotes significance at 95% level, * at 90% level
The coefficient reported in the specification with lags is the cumulative effect of change in Pr(Bush).(1) (2) (3) (4)
Subsample ∆Pr(Bush) large ∆Pr(Bush) small High volume Low volume
∆Pr(Bush)*Gore-favored -0.0569** -0.2515* -0.0532** -0.0805
(0.0220) (0.1481) (0.0214) (0.0648)
∆Pr(Bush)*Bush-favored 0.0328* -0.1249 0.0184 0.1134**
(0.0185) (0.1246) (0.0180) (0.0545)
∆Gallup(Bush)*Gore-favored
∆Gallup(Bush)*Bush-favored
Obs 4690 4620 4690 4620
R-squared 0.0190 0.0315 0.0272 0.0190
Equity fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Differential return 0.0897** 0.1266 0.0715** 0.1939**
Table 4
Capitalization of Policy Platforms: Robustness Checks with Daily Data
Notes: dependent variable is abnormal rate of return, standard errors in parentheses, ** denotes significance at 95% level, * at 90% level(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specification Daily (4 lags) Weekly (1 lag) Daily (4 leads) Weekly (1 lead)
∆Pr(Bush)*Gore-favored -0.0586** -0.1255** -0.0550** -0.0889*
(0.0210) (0.0472) (0.0222) (0.0502)
∆Pr(Bush)*Bush-favored 0.0351** 0.0401 0.0297 0.0490
(0.0177) (0.0397) (0.0186) (0.0422)
Obs 9030 1750 9030 1750
R-squared 0.0242 0.1330 0.0229 0.1295
Equity fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Differential return 0.0938** 0.1656** 0.0848** 0.1379**
Table 5
Capitalization of Policy Platforms: Robustness Checks Controlling for IEM Leads and Lags
Notes: dependent variable is abnormal rate of return, standard errors in parentheses, ** denotes significance at 95% level, * at 90% level


















Differential return 0.1366 0.1765
∆Pr(Bush)*Bush-favored 0.1310** 0.0731
(0.0576) (0.1465)
Panel D: Microsoft versus Competitors
Panel E: Tobacco
Table 6: Capitalization of Policy Platforms: Sector Analysis
Panel A: Pharmaceutical
Panel B: Defense
Panel C: EnergyVariable Description Bush-favored Gore-favored
Contributions to Bush
Firm Contributions to RNC plus PAC 
contributions to candidate
$163,667 $69,480
Contributions to Gore  Firm Contributions to DNC $56,659 $56,345
Soft Contributions to Bush Firm Contributions to RNC $162,549 $68,628
Soft Contributions to Gore Firm Contributions to DNC $56,659 $56,344
Hard Contributions to Bush Firm PAC contributions to candidate $1,118 $852
Hard Contributions to Gore Firm PAC contributions to candidate $0 $0
Table 7: Average Campaign Contributions by Favored Candidate(1) (2)
Frequency Daily Weekly
∆Pr(Bush)*C
Gore / Vt-1 -2099.03** 975.82
(815.58) (1801.65)
∆Pr(Bush)*C




Equity fixed effects yes yes
Differential return 4034.00** 802.76
Notes: dependent variable is abnormal rate of return, standard errors in parentheses, ** denotes significance at 95% level, * at 90% level
Table 8
Campaign Contribution Analysis







Gore / Vt-1 -1980.43*
(1168.58)
C




Equity fixed effects no no
Differential return 0.0387 2999.68
Notes: dependent variable is abnormal rate of return, standard errors in parentheses, ** denotes significance at 95% level, * at 90% level
Florida Recount Event Study: November 8 through December 14, 2000
Table 9